Backtestshugorun-20260922-141813#15302

Issue #15302 Merged fix PR # Run 22 Sep 2026 · run-20260922-141813 gohugoio/hugo

Add config option security.http.proxyFromEnvironment = false

Worse

The merged fix was judged better than our patch.

In this judgment, Patch A = our agent, Patch B = the merged fix.

Both add the `proxyFromEnvironment` flag defaulting off and both correctly disable the environment proxy in the default case, so the default hardening is equivalent. The decisive difference is the opt-in path. Patch A, when the flag is enabled, leaves the cloned transport's `base.Proxy = http.ProxyFromEnvironment` but keeps the same `Control`/`CheckAllowedHTTPAddress` dialer for every dial. Since a proxied request is dialed to the proxy address, the dial-time address check then runs against the *proxy*, so a proxy on a loopback or private address is rejected. That is exactly the scenario the issue names ('HTTPS_PROXY set on users machine or in CI') — a localhost/internal proxy — so Patch A's opt-in fails to actually let those users through under the default allowlist; it re-enables the proxy but re-blocks it. Patch B builds a per-request proxy resolution (proxyTransport + context-carried proxy URL + canonicalAddr) so the dial to the proxy bypasses the address check (the user has opted into trusting the proxy), while direct/NO_PROXY dials — and even a direct dial to the proxy's own address — remain validated, closing the obvious hole. This resolves the root cause for the described case. Tests: Patch A only asserts `tr.Proxy == nil`/`!= nil`, a near-tautological field check that would not catch the loopback-proxy failure; Patch B stands up real httptest proxy and target servers and asserts default-ignored, enabled-via-loopback-proxy, and still-denied direct loopback dials — tests that genuinely fail before and pass after and exercise the security boundary. Patch B is larger and adds user-facing docs (security.md, docs.yaml) and an httpproxy dependency, but the docs are appropriate for a new security config option and the complexity is proportionate to correctly handling internal proxies. Patch A is more surgical and lacks docs, but its incompleteness on the core scenario outweighs its smaller footprint. B wins on correctness and tests.

The judge saw only the two patches, labelled A and B in random order, with issue links and version numbers removed. The reasoning above is shown verbatim.

Solve

33m 11s13 turns

Wall-clock time in the container

Full test suite

No new failures

3,752 passed · 100 skipped · 3,858 total

Contamination audit

Unknown

See the audit notes for this run

Patch size

85vs 167 merged

Changed lines, ours vs merged

This is a security hardening issue.

In d6e6f9e500eebdeae8e28de830fff2e3bfc7d534 (unreleased) we added a dial-time URL validation.

If proxied (e.g. HTTPS_PROXY set on users machine or in CI) the above validation will only see the proxy address. There's no workaround for that, but I suggest by adding a new security.http.proxyFromEnvironment bool config flag (default disabled).

Thanks to @Reload3d for reporting this issue.

The two patches

Our patch+84 −1
config/security/securityConfig.goindex f7cc157b8..5b06a0825 100644@@ -133,6 +133,13 @@ type HTTP struct {  	// Media types where the Content-Type in the response is used instead of resolving from the file content. 	MediaTypes Whitelist `json:"mediaTypes"`++	// ProxyFromEnvironment lets remote HTTP requests use the proxy settings+	// from the environment (HTTP_PROXY, HTTPS_PROXY, NO_PROXY). Disabled by+	// default: a proxy hides the resolved destination address from the+	// dial-time address check (see CheckAllowedHTTPAddress), so honoring the+	// environment proxy would silently bypass that protection.+	ProxyFromEnvironment bool `json:"proxyFromEnvironment"` }  // Node holds Node.js security settings.config/security/securityConfig_test.goindex 4ac059a67..cc1ea997a 100644@@ -135,10 +135,31 @@ func TestToTOML(t *testing.T) { 	got := DefaultConfig.ToTOML()  	c.Assert(got, qt.Equals,-		"[security]\n  allowContent = ['! ^text/html$', '! ^text/org$']\n  enableInlineShortcodes = false\n\n  [security.exec]\n    allow = ['^(dart-)?sass$', '^go$', '^git$', '^node$', '^postcss$']\n    osEnv = ['(?i)^((HTTPS?|NO)_PROXY|PATH(EXT)?|APPDATA|TE?MP|TERM|GO\\w+|(XDG_CONFIG_)?HOME|USERPROFILE|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|DISPLAY|LANG|SYSTEMDRIVE|PROGRAMDATA)$']\n\n  [security.funcs]\n    getenv = ['^HUGO_', '^CI$']\n\n  [security.http]\n    methods = ['(?i)GET|POST']\n    urls = ['(?i)^https?://[a-z0-9]', '! (?i)^https?://\\d+\\.', '! (?i)localhost', '! (?i)^https?://[^/?#]*@']\n\n  [security.node]\n    [security.node.permissions]\n      allowAddons = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowChildProcess = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowRead = ['.']\n      allowWorker = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowWrite = []\n      disable = false",+		"[security]\n  allowContent = ['! ^text/html$', '! ^text/org$']\n  enableInlineShortcodes = false\n\n  [security.exec]\n    allow = ['^(dart-)?sass$', '^go$', '^git$', '^node$', '^postcss$']\n    osEnv = ['(?i)^((HTTPS?|NO)_PROXY|PATH(EXT)?|APPDATA|TE?MP|TERM|GO\\w+|(XDG_CONFIG_)?HOME|USERPROFILE|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|DISPLAY|LANG|SYSTEMDRIVE|PROGRAMDATA)$']\n\n  [security.funcs]\n    getenv = ['^HUGO_', '^CI$']\n\n  [security.http]\n    methods = ['(?i)GET|POST']\n    proxyFromEnvironment = false\n    urls = ['(?i)^https?://[a-z0-9]', '! (?i)^https?://\\d+\\.', '! (?i)localhost', '! (?i)^https?://[^/?#]*@']\n\n  [security.node]\n    [security.node.permissions]\n      allowAddons = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowChildProcess = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowRead = ['.']\n      allowWorker = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowWrite = []\n      disable = false", 	) } +func TestDecodeConfigHTTPProxyFromEnvironment(t *testing.T) {+	t.Parallel()+	c := qt.New(t)++	// Default: the environment proxy is not honored.+	pc, err := DecodeConfig(config.New())+	c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.ProxyFromEnvironment, qt.IsFalse)++	// Opt-in via config.+	tomlConfig := `+[security.http]+proxyFromEnvironment = true+`+	cfg, err := config.FromConfigString(tomlConfig, "toml")+	c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+	pc, err = DecodeConfig(cfg)+	c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.ProxyFromEnvironment, qt.IsTrue)+}+ func TestDecodeConfigDefault(t *testing.T) { 	t.Parallel() 	c := qt.New(t)resources/resource_factories/create/create.goindex a34f9fc7b..576ad1fce 100644@@ -156,6 +156,13 @@ func New(rs *resources.Spec) *Client { // reach internal endpoints. See CheckAllowedHTTPAddress. func newSecureBaseTransport(sec security.Config) http.RoundTripper { 	base := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()+	if !sec.HTTP.ProxyFromEnvironment {+		// A proxy terminates the connection at the proxy address, so the+		// dial-time address check below would only ever see the proxy and not+		// the real destination. Ignore any environment proxy unless the user+		// has explicitly opted in.+		base.Proxy = nil+	} 	d := &net.Dialer{ 		Timeout:   30 * time.Second, 		KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,resources/resource_factories/create/proxy_test.gonew file mode 100644index 000000000..65b092ecc@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@+// Copyright 2021 The Hugo Authors. All rights reserved.+//+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.+// You may obtain a copy of the License at+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0+//+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and+// limitations under the License.++package create++import (+	"net/http"+	"testing"++	qt "github.com/frankban/quicktest"++	"github.com/gohugoio/hugo/config/security"+)++// TestNewSecureBaseTransportProxyFromEnvironment guards the default value of the+// security.http.proxyFromEnvironment option: by default the secure base+// transport must ignore any environment proxy (Proxy is nil), and setting the+// option to true must re-enable it (Proxy is non-nil).+func TestNewSecureBaseTransportProxyFromEnvironment(t *testing.T) {+	t.Parallel()++	c := qt.New(t)++	// Default hardened behavior: the environment proxy is ignored.+	sec := security.DefaultConfig+	c.Assert(sec.HTTP.ProxyFromEnvironment, qt.IsFalse)++	tr, ok := newSecureBaseTransport(sec).(*http.Transport)+	c.Assert(ok, qt.IsTrue)+	c.Assert(tr.Proxy == nil, qt.IsTrue)++	// Opt-in: the environment proxy is honored again.+	sec.HTTP.ProxyFromEnvironment = true++	tr, ok = newSecureBaseTransport(sec).(*http.Transport)+	c.Assert(ok, qt.IsTrue)+	c.Assert(tr.Proxy != nil, qt.IsTrue)+} 
Merged fix · PR #+163 −4
config/security/securityConfig.goindex f7cc157b8..a2708288a 100644@@ -128,6 +128,12 @@ type HTTP struct { 	// URLs to allow in remote HTTP (resources.Get, getJSON, getCSV). 	URLs Whitelist `json:"urls"` +	// Whether to honor the HTTP_PROXY, HTTPS_PROXY and NO_PROXY environment+	// variables for remote HTTP. Off by default, as a proxy hides the+	// resolved destination address from the security policy.+	// <docsmeta>{ "newIn": "0.166.0" }</docsmeta>+	ProxyFromEnvironment bool `json:"proxyFromEnvironment"`+ 	// HTTP methods to allow. 	Methods Whitelist `json:"methods"` config/security/securityConfig_test.goindex 4ac059a67..e6f8c68e3 100644@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ func TestToTOML(t *testing.T) { 	got := DefaultConfig.ToTOML()  	c.Assert(got, qt.Equals,-		"[security]\n  allowContent = ['! ^text/html$', '! ^text/org$']\n  enableInlineShortcodes = false\n\n  [security.exec]\n    allow = ['^(dart-)?sass$', '^go$', '^git$', '^node$', '^postcss$']\n    osEnv = ['(?i)^((HTTPS?|NO)_PROXY|PATH(EXT)?|APPDATA|TE?MP|TERM|GO\\w+|(XDG_CONFIG_)?HOME|USERPROFILE|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|DISPLAY|LANG|SYSTEMDRIVE|PROGRAMDATA)$']\n\n  [security.funcs]\n    getenv = ['^HUGO_', '^CI$']\n\n  [security.http]\n    methods = ['(?i)GET|POST']\n    urls = ['(?i)^https?://[a-z0-9]', '! (?i)^https?://\\d+\\.', '! (?i)localhost', '! (?i)^https?://[^/?#]*@']\n\n  [security.node]\n    [security.node.permissions]\n      allowAddons = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowChildProcess = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowRead = ['.']\n      allowWorker = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowWrite = []\n      disable = false",+		"[security]\n  allowContent = ['! ^text/html$', '! ^text/org$']\n  enableInlineShortcodes = false\n\n  [security.exec]\n    allow = ['^(dart-)?sass$', '^go$', '^git$', '^node$', '^postcss$']\n    osEnv = ['(?i)^((HTTPS?|NO)_PROXY|PATH(EXT)?|APPDATA|TE?MP|TERM|GO\\w+|(XDG_CONFIG_)?HOME|USERPROFILE|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|DISPLAY|LANG|SYSTEMDRIVE|PROGRAMDATA)$']\n\n  [security.funcs]\n    getenv = ['^HUGO_', '^CI$']\n\n  [security.http]\n    methods = ['(?i)GET|POST']\n    proxyFromEnvironment = false\n    urls = ['(?i)^https?://[a-z0-9]', '! (?i)^https?://\\d+\\.', '! (?i)localhost', '! (?i)^https?://[^/?#]*@']\n\n  [security.node]\n    [security.node.permissions]\n      allowAddons = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowChildProcess = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowRead = ['.']\n      allowWorker = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowWrite = []\n      disable = false", 	) } @@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ func TestDecodeConfigDefault(t *testing.T) { 	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.Methods.Accept("get"), qt.IsTrue) 	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.Methods.Accept("DELETE"), qt.IsFalse) 	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.MediaTypes.Accept("application/msword"), qt.IsFalse)+	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.ProxyFromEnvironment, qt.IsFalse)  	c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("PATH"), qt.IsTrue) 	c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("GOROOT"), qt.IsTrue)docs/content/en/configuration/security.mdindex 9efbc0148..54ebb4521 100644@@ -34,9 +34,15 @@ This is the default security configuration: `http.mediaTypes` : (`[]string`) Applicable to the `resources.GetRemote` function, a slice of [regular expressions](g) matching the `Content-Type` in HTTP responses that Hugo trusts, bypassing file content analysis for media type detection. +`http.proxyFromEnvironment`+: {{< new-in 0.166.0 />}}+: (`bool`) Whether the `resources.GetRemote` function honors the `HTTP_PROXY`, `HTTPS_PROXY`, and `NO_PROXY` environment variables. Default is `false`. When a proxy is used, Hugo connects to the proxy rather than the destination, so the resolved address validation described under `http.urls` does not apply.+ `http.urls` : (`[]string`) A slice of [regular expressions](g) matching the URLs that the `resources.GetRemote` function is allowed to access. +  The default allowlist denies URLs with an IP address or `localhost` as the host name. In addition, with the default allowlist, Hugo validates the resolved address when connecting and rejects connections to loopback, private, link-local, and other non-public addresses, e.g. a host name that resolves to a cloud metadata endpoint. This validation is disabled if you override `http.urls`, as the override may intentionally allow access to hosts on your local network, such as a development server.+ `node.permissions.disable` : {{< new-in 0.161.0 />}} : (`bool`) Whether to disable the Node.js [permission model][]. When `false`, Hugo runs Node.js tools with the `--permission` flag, restricting their file system and resource access to what is explicitly allowed below. Default is `false`.docs/data/docs.yamlindex e51915c49..6d2578339 100644@@ -2253,6 +2253,7 @@ config:       mediaTypes: null       methods:       - (?i)GET|POST+      proxyFromEnvironment: false       urls:       - (?i)^https?://[a-z0-9]       - '! (?i)^https?://\d+\.'resources/resource_factories/create/create.goindex a34f9fc7b..1570c2648 100644@@ -16,9 +16,11 @@ package create  import (+	"context" 	"errors" 	"net" 	"net/http"+	"net/url" 	"os" 	"path" 	"path/filepath"@@ -26,6 +28,8 @@ import ( 	"syscall" 	"time" +	"golang.org/x/net/http/httpproxy"+ 	"github.com/bep/helpers/contexthelpers"  	"github.com/bep/logg"@@ -65,6 +69,7 @@ type contextKey uint8  const ( 	contextKeyResourceID contextKey = iota+	contextKeyProxyURL )  // New creates a new Client with the given specification.@@ -154,17 +159,80 @@ func New(rs *resources.Spec) *Client { // hook that validates the resolved destination address against the security // policy, so a hostname resolving to an internal address cannot be used to // reach internal endpoints. See CheckAllowedHTTPAddress.+//+// Proxies are only used when security.http.proxyFromEnvironment is enabled.+// A proxied connection is dialed to the proxy, not the destination, so the+// address check is skipped for that dial; the user has opted into trusting+// the proxy with the destination. The proxy decision is carried per request+// in its context, so a direct dial is always validated, even to the proxy's+// own address. func newSecureBaseTransport(sec security.Config) http.RoundTripper { 	base := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()-	d := &net.Dialer{+	secureDialer := &net.Dialer{ 		Timeout:   30 * time.Second, 		KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second, 		Control: func(network, address string, _ syscall.RawConn) error { 			return sec.CheckAllowedHTTPAddress(network, address) 		}, 	}-	base.DialContext = d.DialContext-	return base+	base.Proxy = nil+	base.DialContext = secureDialer.DialContext++	if !sec.HTTP.ProxyFromEnvironment {+		return base+	}++	proxyFromCtx := func(ctx context.Context) *url.URL {+		u, _ := ctx.Value(contextKeyProxyURL).(*url.URL)+		return u+	}+	base.Proxy = func(req *http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {+		return proxyFromCtx(req.Context()), nil+	}+	proxyDialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: secureDialer.Timeout, KeepAlive: secureDialer.KeepAlive}+	base.DialContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {+		if u := proxyFromCtx(ctx); u != nil && canonicalAddr(u) == addr {+			return proxyDialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)+		}+		return secureDialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)+	}+	return &proxyTransport{base: base, proxyFunc: httpproxy.FromEnvironment().ProxyFunc()}+}++// proxyTransport resolves the proxy for each request up front and stores it+// in the request context, where both the Proxy and DialContext hooks of base+// can see it.+type proxyTransport struct {+	base      *http.Transport+	proxyFunc func(*url.URL) (*url.URL, error)+}++func (t *proxyTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {+	u, err := t.proxyFunc(req.URL)+	if err != nil {+		return nil, err+	}+	if u != nil {+		req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), contextKeyProxyURL, u))+	}+	return t.base.RoundTrip(req)+}++// canonicalAddr mirrors net/http's canonicalAddr: the host:port the transport+// dials for u, with the port defaulted from the scheme.+func canonicalAddr(u *url.URL) string {+	port := u.Port()+	if port == "" {+		switch u.Scheme {+		case "http":+			port = "80"+		case "https":+			port = "443"+		case "socks5", "socks5h":+			port = "1080"+		}+	}+	return net.JoinHostPort(u.Hostname(), port) }  // Copy copies r to the new targetPath.resources/resource_factories/create/remote_test.goindex f9830c842..d7bb98361 100644@@ -14,8 +14,10 @@ package create  import (+	"io" 	"net/http" 	"net/http/httptest"+	"sync/atomic" 	"testing"  	qt "github.com/frankban/quicktest"@@ -173,3 +175,78 @@ urls = ['.*'] 	c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil) 	resp.Body.Close() }++// Proxies from the environment are ignored unless+// security.http.proxyFromEnvironment is enabled. When enabled, the dial-time+// address check does not apply to the proxy itself. See issue 15302.+func TestSecureBaseTransportProxyFromEnvironment(t *testing.T) {+	c := qt.New(t)++	var proxyHits, targetHits atomic.Int32+	proxy := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {+		proxyHits.Add(1)+		w.Write([]byte("via proxy"))+	}))+	t.Cleanup(proxy.Close)+	target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {+		targetHits.Add(1)+		w.Write([]byte("direct"))+	}))+	t.Cleanup(target.Close)++	t.Setenv("HTTP_PROXY", proxy.URL)+	t.Setenv("NO_PROXY", "")+	t.Setenv("no_proxy", "")++	decode := func(toml string) security.Config {+		sec, err := security.DecodeConfig(config.FromTOMLConfigString(toml))+		c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+		return sec+	}+	fetch := func(sec security.Config, u string) (string, error) {+		req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", u, nil)+		c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+		resp, err := newSecureBaseTransport(sec).RoundTrip(req)+		if err != nil {+			return "", err+		}+		defer resp.Body.Close()+		b, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)+		c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+		return string(b), nil+	}++	// Default: proxy ignored, fetched directly.+	body, err := fetch(decode(`+[security.http]+urls = ['.*']+`), target.URL)+	c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+	c.Assert(body, qt.Equals, "direct")+	c.Assert(proxyHits.Load(), qt.Equals, int32(0))+	c.Assert(targetHits.Load(), qt.Equals, int32(1))++	// Enabled: the loopback proxy is dialed even under the default hardened+	// policy, and the destination is never dialed directly.+	body, err = fetch(decode(`+[security.http]+proxyFromEnvironment = true+`), "http://example.com/")+	c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+	c.Assert(body, qt.Equals, "via proxy")+	c.Assert(proxyHits.Load(), qt.Equals, int32(1))+	c.Assert(targetHits.Load(), qt.Equals, int32(1))++	// Enabled, but loopback destinations are never proxied: the address+	// check still applies to the direct dial, also when the destination is+	// the proxy's own address.+	for _, u := range []string{target.URL, proxy.URL} {+		_, err = fetch(decode(`+[security.http]+proxyFromEnvironment = true+`), u)+		c.Assert(security.IsAccessDenied(err), qt.IsTrue, qt.Commentf(u))+	}+	c.Assert(proxyHits.Load(), qt.Equals, int32(1))+	c.Assert(targetHits.Load(), qt.Equals, int32(1))+} 

What the agent reported

The fix is complete, reviewed, and the gate passes. Here is the final report.

What was wrong

Commit d6e6f9e5 (unreleased) added a dial-time destination-address check (CheckAllowedHTTPAddress, installed as a net.Dialer Control hook in newSecureBaseTransport) so that a hostname resolving to an internal address can't reach internal endpoints via resources.GetRemote. But Hugo's HTTP transport is a clone of http.DefaultTransport, whose Proxy is http.ProxyFromEnvironment. When a proxy is configured in the environment (HTTPS_PROXY, etc., common in CI), the dialer connects to the proxy address, so the dial-time check only ever validates the proxy — silently bypassing the protection with no workaround.

What I changed

  1. config/security/securityConfig.go — Added a new field to the HTTP struct: go ProxyFromEnvironment bool `json:"proxyFromEnvironment"` with a doc comment. Default is the zero value false (DefaultConfig unchanged), so the environment proxy is disabled by default and DecodeConfig picks it up automatically.
  1. resources/resource_factories/create/create.go — In newSecureBaseTransport, gated the cloned transport's proxy: go if !sec.HTTP.ProxyFromEnvironment { base.Proxy = nil } By default this forces direct dials, so the dial-time address check sees the real destination. Setting the flag re-enables the environment proxy for users who need it.

Test evidence

  • resources/resource_factories/create/proxy_test.go (new) — TestNewSecureBaseTransportProxyFromEnvironment: with default config asserts tr.Proxy == nil; with the flag set asserts tr.Proxy != nil. The default-case assertion fails on pre-change code (where Proxy was http.ProxyFromEnvironment, non-nil), so it is a genuine regression guard for the exact reported scenario.
  • config/security/securityConfig_test.go — added TestDecodeConfigHTTPProxyFromEnvironment (default false; true when set via TOML); updated the TestToTOML golden string to include proxyFromEnvironment = false in alphabetical order (mechanical, no existing assertion weakened).
  • Gate: ./bt-test ./config/security/... ./resources/resource_factories/create/... → exit 0. All new and pre-existing tests pass.
  • Reviewer confirmed correct implementation, default-safe posture, meaningful test, no scope creep or scratch files.

Requirements disposition

  • Add security.http.proxyFromEnvironment bool config flag — ✅ Implemented (securityConfig.go), verified by TestDecodeConfigHTTPProxyFromEnvironment and TestToTOML.
  • Default disabled (false) — ✅ Implemented (zero value; not present in DefaultConfig), verified by default-case assertions in both new tests.
  • When disabled, the environment proxy must not be honored (so the dial-time check isn't bypassed) — ✅ Implemented (create.go sets base.Proxy = nil), verified by TestNewSecureBaseTransportProxyFromEnvironment (default Proxy == nil; opt-in Proxy != nil).

Note: AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md show as deleted in git status — pre-existing environment state, not part of this change. All changes are left uncommitted in the working tree.