Backtestshugorun-20261002-200313#15302

Issue #15302 Merged fix PR # Run 2 Oct 2026 · run-20261002-200313 gohugoio/hugo

Add config option security.http.proxyFromEnvironment = false

Worse

The merged fix was judged better than our patch.

In this judgment, Patch B = our agent, Patch A = the merged fix.

Both patches add the `security.http.proxyFromEnvironment` flag, default false, with matching config, docs and TOML test updates. When the flag is off, both set `base.Proxy = nil`, which closes the bypass the issue describes. They differ in what happens when a user opts in.

Patch B sets `base.Proxy = http.ProxyFromEnvironment` and keeps the address-validating dialer for every dial, including the dial to the proxy itself. Proxies usually sit on loopback or a private network address (corporate proxies, local CI proxies). The dial-time check rejects such addresses under the default policy, so the opt-in fails in the common case. Users would have to also loosen `http.urls` (which disables the validation entirely) to make it work.

Patch A handles this properly:
- It resolves the proxy per request via `httpproxy.FromEnvironment` and stores it in the request context.
- It skips the address check only when the dialed address equals the canonical address of the chosen proxy.
- Direct dials, including direct requests to the proxy's own address, still go through the secure dialer.

This makes the opt-in usable without weakening validation for non-proxied traffic, which is the trust model the issue implies: opting in means trusting the proxy.

On tests, Patch A is behavioral. It uses real httptest proxy and target servers and checks three things:
- With the flag off, the proxy is ignored.
- With the flag on, a loopback proxy is used under the hardened default policy.
- Direct loopback destinations, including the proxy's own address, are still denied.

Patch B's test only checks whether `tr.Proxy` is nil or non-nil. It would catch the regression, but it does not exercise behavior and would not reveal the broken opt-in.

Patch A is more complex: a wrapper RoundTripper, a context key, and a `canonicalAddr` that mirrors net/http. That adds some maintenance risk, but the code is well commented and the extra logic is directly tied to making the feature correct. Patch A also adds useful docs on the address validation. Overall Patch A is the more correct and better-tested fix.

The judge saw only the two patches, labelled A and B in random order, with issue links and version numbers removed. The reasoning above is shown verbatim.

Solve

46m 18s

Wall-clock time in the container

Full test suite

No new failures

3,755 passed · 100 skipped · 3,857 total

Contamination audit

Clean

No sign the agent saw the real fix

Patch size

45vs 167 merged

Changed lines, ours vs merged

This is a security hardening issue.

In d6e6f9e500eebdeae8e28de830fff2e3bfc7d534 (unreleased) we added a dial-time URL validation.

If proxied (e.g. HTTPS_PROXY set on users machine or in CI) the above validation will only see the proxy address. There's no workaround for that, but I suggest by adding a new security.http.proxyFromEnvironment bool config flag (default disabled).

Thanks to @Reload3d for reporting this issue.

The two patches

Our patch+44 −1
config/security/securityConfig.goindex f7cc157b8..92bb0d063 100644@@ -133,6 +133,13 @@ type HTTP struct {  	// Media types where the Content-Type in the response is used instead of resolving from the file content. 	MediaTypes Whitelist `json:"mediaTypes"`++	// Whether to use the proxy configured in the environment (HTTP_PROXY,+	// HTTPS_PROXY and NO_PROXY) for remote HTTP requests.+	// When proxied, the dial-time address validation only sees the proxy+	// address and not the final destination, so this is disabled by default.+	// <docsmeta>{ "newIn": "0.166.0" }</docsmeta>+	ProxyFromEnvironment bool `json:"proxyFromEnvironment"` }  // Node holds Node.js security settings.config/security/securityConfig_test.goindex 4ac059a67..e6f8c68e3 100644@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ func TestToTOML(t *testing.T) { 	got := DefaultConfig.ToTOML()  	c.Assert(got, qt.Equals,-		"[security]\n  allowContent = ['! ^text/html$', '! ^text/org$']\n  enableInlineShortcodes = false\n\n  [security.exec]\n    allow = ['^(dart-)?sass$', '^go$', '^git$', '^node$', '^postcss$']\n    osEnv = ['(?i)^((HTTPS?|NO)_PROXY|PATH(EXT)?|APPDATA|TE?MP|TERM|GO\\w+|(XDG_CONFIG_)?HOME|USERPROFILE|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|DISPLAY|LANG|SYSTEMDRIVE|PROGRAMDATA)$']\n\n  [security.funcs]\n    getenv = ['^HUGO_', '^CI$']\n\n  [security.http]\n    methods = ['(?i)GET|POST']\n    urls = ['(?i)^https?://[a-z0-9]', '! (?i)^https?://\\d+\\.', '! (?i)localhost', '! (?i)^https?://[^/?#]*@']\n\n  [security.node]\n    [security.node.permissions]\n      allowAddons = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowChildProcess = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowRead = ['.']\n      allowWorker = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowWrite = []\n      disable = false",+		"[security]\n  allowContent = ['! ^text/html$', '! ^text/org$']\n  enableInlineShortcodes = false\n\n  [security.exec]\n    allow = ['^(dart-)?sass$', '^go$', '^git$', '^node$', '^postcss$']\n    osEnv = ['(?i)^((HTTPS?|NO)_PROXY|PATH(EXT)?|APPDATA|TE?MP|TERM|GO\\w+|(XDG_CONFIG_)?HOME|USERPROFILE|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|DISPLAY|LANG|SYSTEMDRIVE|PROGRAMDATA)$']\n\n  [security.funcs]\n    getenv = ['^HUGO_', '^CI$']\n\n  [security.http]\n    methods = ['(?i)GET|POST']\n    proxyFromEnvironment = false\n    urls = ['(?i)^https?://[a-z0-9]', '! (?i)^https?://\\d+\\.', '! (?i)localhost', '! (?i)^https?://[^/?#]*@']\n\n  [security.node]\n    [security.node.permissions]\n      allowAddons = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowChildProcess = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowRead = ['.']\n      allowWorker = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowWrite = []\n      disable = false", 	) } @@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ func TestDecodeConfigDefault(t *testing.T) { 	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.Methods.Accept("get"), qt.IsTrue) 	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.Methods.Accept("DELETE"), qt.IsFalse) 	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.MediaTypes.Accept("application/msword"), qt.IsFalse)+	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.ProxyFromEnvironment, qt.IsFalse)  	c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("PATH"), qt.IsTrue) 	c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("GOROOT"), qt.IsTrue)docs/content/en/configuration/security.mdindex 9efbc0148..bf62869c3 100644@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ This is the default security configuration: `http.mediaTypes` : (`[]string`) Applicable to the `resources.GetRemote` function, a slice of [regular expressions](g) matching the `Content-Type` in HTTP responses that Hugo trusts, bypassing file content analysis for media type detection. +`http.proxyFromEnvironment`+: {{< new-in 0.166.0 />}}+: (`bool`) Whether the `resources.GetRemote` function should use the proxy configured in the `HTTP_PROXY`, `HTTPS_PROXY`, and `NO_PROXY` environment variables. When a proxy is used, Hugo can only validate the address of the proxy, not the address of the final destination. Default is `false`.+ `http.urls` : (`[]string`) A slice of [regular expressions](g) matching the URLs that the `resources.GetRemote` function is allowed to access. docs/data/docs.yamlindex e51915c49..6d2578339 100644@@ -2253,6 +2253,7 @@ config:       mediaTypes: null       methods:       - (?i)GET|POST+      proxyFromEnvironment: false       urls:       - (?i)^https?://[a-z0-9]       - '! (?i)^https?://\d+\.'resources/resource_factories/create/create.goindex a34f9fc7b..cd7e3407a 100644@@ -154,8 +154,17 @@ func New(rs *resources.Spec) *Client { // hook that validates the resolved destination address against the security // policy, so a hostname resolving to an internal address cannot be used to // reach internal endpoints. See CheckAllowedHTTPAddress.+//+// The proxy from the environment (HTTP_PROXY etc.) is only used when+// security.http.proxyFromEnvironment is enabled, as the dial-time hook+// would otherwise only see the proxy's address. func newSecureBaseTransport(sec security.Config) http.RoundTripper { 	base := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()+	if sec.HTTP.ProxyFromEnvironment {+		base.Proxy = http.ProxyFromEnvironment+	} else {+		base.Proxy = nil+	} 	d := &net.Dialer{ 		Timeout:   30 * time.Second, 		KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,resources/resource_factories/create/remote_test.goindex f9830c842..3caeadbdd 100644@@ -173,3 +173,24 @@ urls = ['.*'] 	c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil) 	resp.Body.Close() }++// When proxied, the dial-time address validation only sees the proxy address,+// so the proxy from the environment must not be used unless the user opts in+// via security.http.proxyFromEnvironment.+func TestSecureBaseTransportProxyFromEnvironment(t *testing.T) {+	t.Parallel()++	c := qt.New(t)++	tr := newSecureBaseTransport(security.DefaultConfig).(*http.Transport)+	c.Assert(tr.Proxy, qt.IsNil)++	sec, err := security.DecodeConfig(config.FromTOMLConfigString(`+[security.http]+proxyFromEnvironment = true+`))+	c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+	c.Assert(sec.HTTP.ProxyFromEnvironment, qt.IsTrue)+	tr = newSecureBaseTransport(sec).(*http.Transport)+	c.Assert(tr.Proxy, qt.IsNotNil)+} 
Merged fix · PR #+163 −4
config/security/securityConfig.goindex f7cc157b8..a2708288a 100644@@ -128,6 +128,12 @@ type HTTP struct { 	// URLs to allow in remote HTTP (resources.Get, getJSON, getCSV). 	URLs Whitelist `json:"urls"` +	// Whether to honor the HTTP_PROXY, HTTPS_PROXY and NO_PROXY environment+	// variables for remote HTTP. Off by default, as a proxy hides the+	// resolved destination address from the security policy.+	// <docsmeta>{ "newIn": "0.166.0" }</docsmeta>+	ProxyFromEnvironment bool `json:"proxyFromEnvironment"`+ 	// HTTP methods to allow. 	Methods Whitelist `json:"methods"` config/security/securityConfig_test.goindex 4ac059a67..e6f8c68e3 100644@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ func TestToTOML(t *testing.T) { 	got := DefaultConfig.ToTOML()  	c.Assert(got, qt.Equals,-		"[security]\n  allowContent = ['! ^text/html$', '! ^text/org$']\n  enableInlineShortcodes = false\n\n  [security.exec]\n    allow = ['^(dart-)?sass$', '^go$', '^git$', '^node$', '^postcss$']\n    osEnv = ['(?i)^((HTTPS?|NO)_PROXY|PATH(EXT)?|APPDATA|TE?MP|TERM|GO\\w+|(XDG_CONFIG_)?HOME|USERPROFILE|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|DISPLAY|LANG|SYSTEMDRIVE|PROGRAMDATA)$']\n\n  [security.funcs]\n    getenv = ['^HUGO_', '^CI$']\n\n  [security.http]\n    methods = ['(?i)GET|POST']\n    urls = ['(?i)^https?://[a-z0-9]', '! (?i)^https?://\\d+\\.', '! (?i)localhost', '! (?i)^https?://[^/?#]*@']\n\n  [security.node]\n    [security.node.permissions]\n      allowAddons = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowChildProcess = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowRead = ['.']\n      allowWorker = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowWrite = []\n      disable = false",+		"[security]\n  allowContent = ['! ^text/html$', '! ^text/org$']\n  enableInlineShortcodes = false\n\n  [security.exec]\n    allow = ['^(dart-)?sass$', '^go$', '^git$', '^node$', '^postcss$']\n    osEnv = ['(?i)^((HTTPS?|NO)_PROXY|PATH(EXT)?|APPDATA|TE?MP|TERM|GO\\w+|(XDG_CONFIG_)?HOME|USERPROFILE|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|DISPLAY|LANG|SYSTEMDRIVE|PROGRAMDATA)$']\n\n  [security.funcs]\n    getenv = ['^HUGO_', '^CI$']\n\n  [security.http]\n    methods = ['(?i)GET|POST']\n    proxyFromEnvironment = false\n    urls = ['(?i)^https?://[a-z0-9]', '! (?i)^https?://\\d+\\.', '! (?i)localhost', '! (?i)^https?://[^/?#]*@']\n\n  [security.node]\n    [security.node.permissions]\n      allowAddons = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowChildProcess = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowRead = ['.']\n      allowWorker = ['tailwindcss']\n      allowWrite = []\n      disable = false", 	) } @@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ func TestDecodeConfigDefault(t *testing.T) { 	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.Methods.Accept("get"), qt.IsTrue) 	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.Methods.Accept("DELETE"), qt.IsFalse) 	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.MediaTypes.Accept("application/msword"), qt.IsFalse)+	c.Assert(pc.HTTP.ProxyFromEnvironment, qt.IsFalse)  	c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("PATH"), qt.IsTrue) 	c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("GOROOT"), qt.IsTrue)docs/content/en/configuration/security.mdindex 9efbc0148..54ebb4521 100644@@ -34,9 +34,15 @@ This is the default security configuration: `http.mediaTypes` : (`[]string`) Applicable to the `resources.GetRemote` function, a slice of [regular expressions](g) matching the `Content-Type` in HTTP responses that Hugo trusts, bypassing file content analysis for media type detection. +`http.proxyFromEnvironment`+: {{< new-in 0.166.0 />}}+: (`bool`) Whether the `resources.GetRemote` function honors the `HTTP_PROXY`, `HTTPS_PROXY`, and `NO_PROXY` environment variables. Default is `false`. When a proxy is used, Hugo connects to the proxy rather than the destination, so the resolved address validation described under `http.urls` does not apply.+ `http.urls` : (`[]string`) A slice of [regular expressions](g) matching the URLs that the `resources.GetRemote` function is allowed to access. +  The default allowlist denies URLs with an IP address or `localhost` as the host name. In addition, with the default allowlist, Hugo validates the resolved address when connecting and rejects connections to loopback, private, link-local, and other non-public addresses, e.g. a host name that resolves to a cloud metadata endpoint. This validation is disabled if you override `http.urls`, as the override may intentionally allow access to hosts on your local network, such as a development server.+ `node.permissions.disable` : {{< new-in 0.161.0 />}} : (`bool`) Whether to disable the Node.js [permission model][]. When `false`, Hugo runs Node.js tools with the `--permission` flag, restricting their file system and resource access to what is explicitly allowed below. Default is `false`.docs/data/docs.yamlindex e51915c49..6d2578339 100644@@ -2253,6 +2253,7 @@ config:       mediaTypes: null       methods:       - (?i)GET|POST+      proxyFromEnvironment: false       urls:       - (?i)^https?://[a-z0-9]       - '! (?i)^https?://\d+\.'resources/resource_factories/create/create.goindex a34f9fc7b..1570c2648 100644@@ -16,9 +16,11 @@ package create  import (+	"context" 	"errors" 	"net" 	"net/http"+	"net/url" 	"os" 	"path" 	"path/filepath"@@ -26,6 +28,8 @@ import ( 	"syscall" 	"time" +	"golang.org/x/net/http/httpproxy"+ 	"github.com/bep/helpers/contexthelpers"  	"github.com/bep/logg"@@ -65,6 +69,7 @@ type contextKey uint8  const ( 	contextKeyResourceID contextKey = iota+	contextKeyProxyURL )  // New creates a new Client with the given specification.@@ -154,17 +159,80 @@ func New(rs *resources.Spec) *Client { // hook that validates the resolved destination address against the security // policy, so a hostname resolving to an internal address cannot be used to // reach internal endpoints. See CheckAllowedHTTPAddress.+//+// Proxies are only used when security.http.proxyFromEnvironment is enabled.+// A proxied connection is dialed to the proxy, not the destination, so the+// address check is skipped for that dial; the user has opted into trusting+// the proxy with the destination. The proxy decision is carried per request+// in its context, so a direct dial is always validated, even to the proxy's+// own address. func newSecureBaseTransport(sec security.Config) http.RoundTripper { 	base := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()-	d := &net.Dialer{+	secureDialer := &net.Dialer{ 		Timeout:   30 * time.Second, 		KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second, 		Control: func(network, address string, _ syscall.RawConn) error { 			return sec.CheckAllowedHTTPAddress(network, address) 		}, 	}-	base.DialContext = d.DialContext-	return base+	base.Proxy = nil+	base.DialContext = secureDialer.DialContext++	if !sec.HTTP.ProxyFromEnvironment {+		return base+	}++	proxyFromCtx := func(ctx context.Context) *url.URL {+		u, _ := ctx.Value(contextKeyProxyURL).(*url.URL)+		return u+	}+	base.Proxy = func(req *http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {+		return proxyFromCtx(req.Context()), nil+	}+	proxyDialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: secureDialer.Timeout, KeepAlive: secureDialer.KeepAlive}+	base.DialContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {+		if u := proxyFromCtx(ctx); u != nil && canonicalAddr(u) == addr {+			return proxyDialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)+		}+		return secureDialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)+	}+	return &proxyTransport{base: base, proxyFunc: httpproxy.FromEnvironment().ProxyFunc()}+}++// proxyTransport resolves the proxy for each request up front and stores it+// in the request context, where both the Proxy and DialContext hooks of base+// can see it.+type proxyTransport struct {+	base      *http.Transport+	proxyFunc func(*url.URL) (*url.URL, error)+}++func (t *proxyTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {+	u, err := t.proxyFunc(req.URL)+	if err != nil {+		return nil, err+	}+	if u != nil {+		req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), contextKeyProxyURL, u))+	}+	return t.base.RoundTrip(req)+}++// canonicalAddr mirrors net/http's canonicalAddr: the host:port the transport+// dials for u, with the port defaulted from the scheme.+func canonicalAddr(u *url.URL) string {+	port := u.Port()+	if port == "" {+		switch u.Scheme {+		case "http":+			port = "80"+		case "https":+			port = "443"+		case "socks5", "socks5h":+			port = "1080"+		}+	}+	return net.JoinHostPort(u.Hostname(), port) }  // Copy copies r to the new targetPath.resources/resource_factories/create/remote_test.goindex f9830c842..d7bb98361 100644@@ -14,8 +14,10 @@ package create  import (+	"io" 	"net/http" 	"net/http/httptest"+	"sync/atomic" 	"testing"  	qt "github.com/frankban/quicktest"@@ -173,3 +175,78 @@ urls = ['.*'] 	c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil) 	resp.Body.Close() }++// Proxies from the environment are ignored unless+// security.http.proxyFromEnvironment is enabled. When enabled, the dial-time+// address check does not apply to the proxy itself. See issue 15302.+func TestSecureBaseTransportProxyFromEnvironment(t *testing.T) {+	c := qt.New(t)++	var proxyHits, targetHits atomic.Int32+	proxy := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {+		proxyHits.Add(1)+		w.Write([]byte("via proxy"))+	}))+	t.Cleanup(proxy.Close)+	target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {+		targetHits.Add(1)+		w.Write([]byte("direct"))+	}))+	t.Cleanup(target.Close)++	t.Setenv("HTTP_PROXY", proxy.URL)+	t.Setenv("NO_PROXY", "")+	t.Setenv("no_proxy", "")++	decode := func(toml string) security.Config {+		sec, err := security.DecodeConfig(config.FromTOMLConfigString(toml))+		c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+		return sec+	}+	fetch := func(sec security.Config, u string) (string, error) {+		req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", u, nil)+		c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+		resp, err := newSecureBaseTransport(sec).RoundTrip(req)+		if err != nil {+			return "", err+		}+		defer resp.Body.Close()+		b, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)+		c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+		return string(b), nil+	}++	// Default: proxy ignored, fetched directly.+	body, err := fetch(decode(`+[security.http]+urls = ['.*']+`), target.URL)+	c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+	c.Assert(body, qt.Equals, "direct")+	c.Assert(proxyHits.Load(), qt.Equals, int32(0))+	c.Assert(targetHits.Load(), qt.Equals, int32(1))++	// Enabled: the loopback proxy is dialed even under the default hardened+	// policy, and the destination is never dialed directly.+	body, err = fetch(decode(`+[security.http]+proxyFromEnvironment = true+`), "http://example.com/")+	c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)+	c.Assert(body, qt.Equals, "via proxy")+	c.Assert(proxyHits.Load(), qt.Equals, int32(1))+	c.Assert(targetHits.Load(), qt.Equals, int32(1))++	// Enabled, but loopback destinations are never proxied: the address+	// check still applies to the direct dial, also when the destination is+	// the proxy's own address.+	for _, u := range []string{target.URL, proxy.URL} {+		_, err = fetch(decode(`+[security.http]+proxyFromEnvironment = true+`), u)+		c.Assert(security.IsAccessDenied(err), qt.IsTrue, qt.Commentf(u))+	}+	c.Assert(proxyHits.Load(), qt.Equals, int32(1))+	c.Assert(targetHits.Load(), qt.Equals, int32(1))+}